Anti-Harassment Provisions Revisited: No Bright-Line Rule by McCarthy, Martha
Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal
Volume 2008 | Number 2 Article 3
Fall 3-2-2008
Anti-Harassment Provisions Revisited: No Bright-
Line Rule
Martha McCarthy
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Education and Law Journal by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment Provisions Revisited: No Bright-Line Rule, 2008 BYU Educ. & L.J. 225 (2008).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2008/iss2/3
.
ANTI- HARASSMENT PROVISIONS REVISITED: N 0 
BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
Martha McCarthy* 
Considerable attention in education and legal circles has 
focused on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Morse u. 
Frederick.l While this ruling answers some questions 
regarding students' expression rights, it provides little 
clarification about challenges to public school districts' policies 
or practices prohibiting harassing and demeaning expression. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court passed up a recent 
opportunity to provide guidance in this arena when it vacated 
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harper u. Poway Unified School 
District without addressing the merits of the case.2 In the 
absence of clear Supreme Court guidance, lower court rulings 
in cases challenging such anti-harassment restrictions are 
difficult to reconcile with each other and with student 
expression litigation in general. These cases are particularly 
sensitive because they highlight the tension between the 
protection of students' First Amendment rights to freely 
express their views, including religious views, and school 
authorities' duty to maintain a respectful and civil school 
environment. Recent legal developments have left educators 
unsure regarding how to balance public schools' obligations and 
students' rights in terms of appropriate and protected 
expression in public schools. 
This Article revisits cases rendered since 2000 challenging 
school districts' anti-harassment restrictions. In Section I, the 
Supreme Court's rulings on students' free speech rights are 
briefly reviewed to provide a context regarding the governing 
legal principles. Section II examines two rulings of the Third 
Circuit as an example of how lower courts have applied 
• Chancellor's Professor and Chair, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, 
Indiana University. 
1. 127 S. Ct. 261H (2007). 
2. 445 F.3d 1Hi6 (9th Cir. 2006). vacated and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss as moot. 127 S. Ct. 14H4 (2007). 
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Supreme Court precedent to challenges to anti-harassment 
policies. Sections III and IV, respectively, discuss the 
inconsistencies among lower court rulings across circuits 
regarding displays of the Confederate flag and expressions of 
religious beliefs that demean homosexuality. Section V 
addresses possible future directions of litigation in this arena 
and reviews the meager guidance for school authorities that 
can be gleaned from the cases to date. 
I. CONTEXT: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
Since the late 1960s, the Supreme Court has rendered four 
decisions directly addressing public school students' free 
expression rights.:l The legal principles established in these 
cases are briefly reviewed below because lower courts apply 
these principles in assessing current challenges to school 
districts' anti-harassment policies. 
The seminal decision, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,4 marked the Supreme Court's 
entry into the arena of constitutional protection of students' 
expression rights. The Supreme Court in Tinker declared that 
students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"fi and "may not be 
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are 
officially approved."6 Tinker focused on disciplinary action 
against students who wore black armbands to protest the 
Vietnam War in violation of a school board policy that was 
enacted after the district's principals learned that the students 
:i. Sec Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 261H (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (l98H); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:3 v. Frn.sm', 478 U.S. 67fi 
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :39:3 U.S. fiO:l (1969). The Court 
also has addressed studlmt expression rights under thl' Federal Equal Access Act, 20 
U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000), and in connection with students attending state-supported 
institutions of higher education. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. 
ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (HJ9fi) (holding that a university could not withhold support from a 
student religious group seeking to use student activity funds to publish sectarian 
materials): Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. Dist. fi6 v. MPrgens. 496 U.S. 226 
(1990) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the Ft•cheral Equal Access Act. 
which stipulates that federally assisted secondary schools with a limited forum for 
student groups to mPPt during noninstructional time cannot denY school access to 
noncurriculum student groups based on the religious, philosophical. or political content 
of their meetings). 
4. 39:3 U.S. fiO:l (1969). 
5. Id. at 506. 
6. Id. at 511. 
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planned to engage in this form of passive, silent protest. 7 In 
holding for the students, the Court in Tinker ruled that 
students can express their private ideological views at school 
unless such expression threatens a "substantial disruption" of 
the educational process or collides with the rights of others.i-l 
The Supreme Court did not deliver another student-
expression decision until 1986, and this ruling, Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser,9 narrowed the circumstances under 
which Tinker applies. In Fraser, the Court granted school 
authorities considerable discretion in curtailing expression 
they consider to be lewd and vulgar.lO Reversing the courts 
below, the Supreme Court upheld a student's suspension for 
using a sexual metaphor in a nominating speech during a 
student government assembly.ll The Court concluded that 
sexual innuendos could offend both teachers and students even 
though the expression did not cause a disruption.12 Declaring 
that "[s]urely it is a highly appropriate function of public school 
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in 
public discourse,"l :J the Fraser majority found it "perfectly 
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the 
point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is 
wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public 
school education."l4 The Court further stated that the school 
board is the proper body to determine what manner of student 
speech is appropriate in classrooms and assemblies.15 
In 1988, only two years after rendering Fraser, the 
Supreme Court delivered its third decision, Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier, drawing a distinction between school-
sponsored and private student expression.l6 The controversy 
focused on a high school principal's deletion of two pages from 
the school newspaper because of the content of articles on 
divorce and teenage pregnancy and concerns that individuals 
'. !d. at 604. 
8. /d.at51:i14. 
9. ,178 U.S. 67R (1986). 
10. /d. at 68:3--86. 
11. /d. at 677-78. 687. 
12. Sec id. at 68:!. 
1:1. /d. at 68:3. 
14. /d. at 685-8fi. 
15. !d. at 68:1. 
16. 484 U.S. 260. 270-71 (191:'8). 
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could be identified in the articles.17 Upholding the principal's 
actions, the Supreme Court declared "that educators do not 
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over 
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."lk The Court 
rejected the assertion that the school newspaper had been 
established as a public forum for student expression, reasoning 
that school authorities must exhibit a clear intent for school 
activities to become a public forum.l!-l Conceding that public 
schools at times must tolerate private student expression to 
respect constitutional guarantees, the Court emphasized that 
school authorities can censor student speech that represents 
the school.20 The Court declared that a school does not have to 
condone student speech appearing to bear the school's 
imprimatur if it is inconsistent with the school's '"basic 
educational mission,' even though the government could not 
censor similar speech outside the school."21 
The above trilogy of Supreme Court decisions was applied 
by lower courts in assessing student expression rights for 
almost two decades until the Court rendered its fourth decision 
in 2007, Morse u. Frederick.22 The Court in Morse held that 
given the special circumstances in public schools, students can 
be disciplined for expression reasonably viewed as promoting or 
celebrating illegal drug use.23 This case attracted substantial 
national attention and focused on a banner containing the 
phrase, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS," which plaintiff Joseph 
Frederick and some friends unfurled across the street from 
their school as the Olympic torch relay passed by.24 After 
Frederick refused to lower the banner, the principal confiscated 
it and subsequently suspended Frederick.25 The Court declined 
to apply legal standards used to assess students' off-campus 
17. Id. al 26:'3. 
18. Id. at 27:3. 
19. Id. at 269-70. 
20. Id. at 270-71. 
21. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:) v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675. 685 
(1986)). 
22. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
23. Id. at 2629. 
24. Id. at 2622. 
25. Id. 
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behavior, because the students were under the school's control 
when they were allowed to go outside on the public sidewalk to 
watch the torch relay.26 
Reversing the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the school 
could not censor non-disruptive, off-campus student speech 
that conveyed "a social message contrary to the one favored by 
the school" during a school-authorized event,27 the Supreme 
Court upheld disciplinary action for display of the banner, 
which the principal viewed as promoting illegal drug use.28 The 
majority emphasized the importance of deterring drug use by 
schoolchildren and concluded that Frederick's action violated 
the school board's policy prohibiting expression advocating use 
of illegal substances.29 The Court declared that Fraser stands 
for the propositions that (1) the public school is a special 
environment in terms of expression rights, and (2) 
considerations beyond the Tinker disruption standard are 
appropriate in assessing student expression in public schools.30 
However, a majority of the justices declined to extend school 
authorities' discretion to allow them to curtail any student 
expression they find plainly offensive:n or at odds with the 
school's educational mission,32 which would allow school 
officials too much discretion. All of the justices agreed that 
students can be disciplined for promoting the use of illegal 
drugs, but they differed regarding whether the banner at issue 
actually did so.:3:3 
The legal principles established by the Supreme Court in 
26. Id. at 2624. 
27. Frederick v. Morse, 4:l9 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006). 
28. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622-23. 
29. Id. at 2628-29. 
30. Id. at 2626-27. All the justices agreed that the principal should not be held 
liable for violating clearly established law; Justice Breyer thought the decision should 
have focused only on this issue. See id. at 2641 (Breyer, .J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (stating that if the case had been decided on qualified immunity 
grounds. and not First Amendment grounds, the decision would have been unanimous 
because even the dissent agreed that the principal was not liable for damages). 
:n. Id. at 2629. 
32. Id. at 26:17 (Alito, ,J., joined by Kennedy. J., concurring) (Justices Alito and 
Kennedy emphasized that this decision does not extend to other political or social 
issues that may be viewed as inconsistent with the school's mission). Since the 
legalization of marijuana has been controversial in Alaska, perhaps if the banner had 
been cast as advocating a change in state law. Frederick would have prevailed. 
33. See id. at 2646-47, 2649 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsberg & Souter, JJ., 
dissenting) (arguing that the banner was a nonsensical effort to get on television and 
promoted nothing). 
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these cases govern student expression rights, but lower courts 
have not spoken with a single voice in interpreting and 
applying these standards. The principles seem particularly 
difficult to apply in litigation involving religious challenges to 
school districts' anti-harassment provisions.:14 
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT DRAWS ATTENTION TO ANTI-
HARASSMENT POLICIES 
Prior to the twenty-first century, it was generally assumed 
that school authorities could curtail harassing student 
expression and that it was legitimate for public schools to enact 
anti-harassment policies as part of their obligation to instill 
basic values in students and maintain a proper environment 
for learning.35 A distinction was drawn between higher 
education, where students are more mature and choose to 
enroll, and the vulnerable captive student bodies in public 
elementary and secondary schools. Whereas some policies 
restricting hate speech have been struck down in 
postsecondary institutions,36 the conventional wisdom has been 
that public schools have greater discretion to curtail such 
disrespectful and hurtful expression, beyond that actionable 
under civil rights laws,37 to fulfill their obligation to inculcate 
essential values in a democratic society.3S 
The Third Circuit attracted national attention in 2001 
when it rendered its decision in Saxe v. State College Area 
School District (SCASD), reversing the court below and 
striking down a Pennsylvania school district's anti-harassment 
policy that prohibited disrespectful expression considered a 
threat to the school environment and individual well-being.:39 
The SCASD policy defined "harassment" as "verbal or physical 
conduct based on one's actual or perceived race, religion, color, 
:H. See infra text accompanying notes 46-55 and 112- l:lS. 
:l5. See CHAI{LJ<:S A. BEARD, MARY R. BEARD & WILLIAM BEARD, NI.:W BASIC 
HISTORY OF TilE UNITim STATES 228 (1960); Martha McCarthy, Anti-Hamssment 
Policies in Public Schools: How Vulnerable Are They?, :n ,J. L. & Eouc. 52 (2002). 
:16. See, e.g. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ .. 55 F.:id 1177 (6th Cir. 199;)): UW:\1 
Post Inc. v. Ed. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 116:3 (E.D. Wis. 1991). 
:37. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. ~ 2000d (2000): Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S. C. ~ H5R l (2000): infra text 
accompanying note 46. 
::ls. McCarthy, supra note 35, at 5fi. 
:l9. 240 F.::ld 200 (:id Cir. 2001), rev g. 77 F. Supp. 2d 621. 6:27 (M.D. l'a. 19~)9). 
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national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other 
personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of 
substantially interfering with a student's educational 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
environment."40 The policy covered unwelcome conduct 
offending or belittling others based on any of the above 
factors41 and defined the category of "other harassment" as 
harassment on the basis of such things as "clothing, physical 
appearance, social skills, peer group, income, intellect, 
educational program, hobbies or values, etc.," that may 
substantially interfere with a student's educational 
performance or create "an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
environment." 42 
The SCASD policy was challenged by plaintiffs who feared 
reprisals for voicing their religious views about moral issues, 
including the distribution of religious literature describing the 
harmful effects of homosexuality. 4:3 The Third Circuit reversed 
the decision of the court below in a ruling authored by Justice 
Alito before his confirmation to the Supreme Court. 
Recognizing that "preventing discrimination in the 
workplace-and in the schools-is not only a legitimate, but a 
compelling, government interest" and that "speech may be 
more readily subject to restrictions" in schools that have a 
captive audience, 44 the Third Circuit nonetheless found the 
SCASD policy unconstitutionally overbroad.45 The appeals 
court reviewed existing anti-discrimination laws and litigation 
in detail to refute the district court's conclusion that the anti-
harassment policy simply barred expression already prohibited 
by legislation.46 Instead, the Third Circuit found some 
40. !d. at 202 (quoting SCASD Anti-Harassment Policy. General Statement of 
Policy. para. 2 (approved Aug. 9, 1999), inclnded in Saxe. 240 F.:ld app. at 21t~-2:l 
[hereinafter General Statement]). 
41. General Statement, at para. 4. 
42. SCASD Anti-Harassment Policy, Definitions, para. 9 (approved Aug. 9, HJ99), 
inclnded in Saxe, 240 F.:Jd app. at 220. The court faulted thP school district for 
addressing what constitutes prohibited expression in separate passages of the policy. 
as they arguably could be interpreted as providing different definitions of the hamll'd 
speech. Saxe. 240 F.3d at 215. 
4::l. See Saxe, 240 F.:3d at 203. 
44. !d. at 209-10. 
45. !d. at 217. 
4!i. See id. at 204-()(i (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. fi29 
(1999): Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993): Meritor Sav. Bank. FSB v. 
Vinson. ·177 U.S. 57 (19H6)). While recognizing that individuals can challc>nge 
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expression covered by the SCASD policy to be beyond what is 
actionable under federal civil rights laws. The appeals court 
considered the policy's catch-all category, barring harassment 
based on "other personal characteristics," particularly 
troublesome and likely to encompass some protected 
expression.47 Also, the court reasoned that harassing 
expression based on values "strikes at the heart of moral and 
political discourse," which is a "core concern of the First 
Amendment." 48 
Rejecting the assertion that harassing speech is beyond 
constitutional protection, the Third Circuit found no judicial 
precedent supporting a "categorical rule that divests 
'harassing' speech, as defined by federal anti-discrimination 
statutes, of First Amendment protection."49 And even if such a 
contention were true, the appeals court emphasized that the 
SCASD policy would be struck down because its reach was 
broader than any anti-discrimination laws.50 
The Third Circuit turned to First Amendment expresswn 
cases involving public school students toward the end of its 
opmwn, acknowledging that offensive expression can be 
curtailed for schoolchildren that could not be restricted for 
adults.51 The court reasoned that Hazelwood was not 
controlling, because the policy did not regulate school-
sponsored expression.52 Also declining to apply Fraser, the 
court appeared to confine the Fraser principle to a 
consideration of the form and manner of expression rather than 
its substance, even though it did recognize that under Fraser 
school districts can categorically prohibit private student 
expression that is lewd, vulgar, or profane.5:3 But the Third 
Circuit stated that the unconstitutional SCASD policy 
harassment based on sex, race. color, national origin, age, and disability under federal 
civil rights laws. the court emphasized that when these anti discrimination laws 
regulate expression based on content or viewpoint, such a "n~striction is ordinarily 
subject to the most exacting First Amendment scrutiny." ld. at 207. 
47. Id.at210. 
48. ld. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 214. 
51. ld. at 212-13 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 
(Hl86)). 
52. See id. at 216. 
53. Id. 
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regulated expression far broader than "Fraser-type speech."54 
Thus, the court reasoned that the speech at issue was governed 
by Tinker's disruption standard, which the anti-harassment 
policy did not satisfy.55 
In a subsequent decision rendered a year later, Sypniewski 
u. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, a different panel 
of the Third Circuit upheld a school policy barring racial 
harassment.56 Unlike the policy in Saxe, the contested policy in 
Sypniewski had been enacted in response to a pattern of racial 
incidents.57 During the 2000-2001 school year, some high 
school students wore clothing displaying the Confederate flag 
as a symbol of their solidarity when they observed what they 
called "White Power Wednesday."58 The school board had 
previously discussed a ban on clothing displaying the 
Confederate flag but declined to enact such a ban until 2001.59 
The policy adopted was one that had been upheld by the Tenth 
Circuit, and it banned various manifestations of racial 
harassment or intimidation.60 
The Warren Hills policy was challenged as being 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face.61 Rejecting 
these assertions, the appeals court reasoned that the policy, 
limited to racially provocative expression, was an appropriate 
nondiscriminatory response by school officials to the history of 
racial tensions in the school district (e.g., students observing 
White Power Wednesdays, writing racist graffiti on school 
walls, engaging in verbal racial harassment, and displaying 
Confederate flags).62 The Third Circuit recognized that 
although public schools can regulate racially hostile conduct 
that is disruptive in the absence of an anti-harassment policy, 
such policies can be helpful in guiding student behavior.63 The 
court was not persuaded that the content restriction (applying 
only to racially offensive content) was unconstitutional, given 
54. Id. 
55. Id.at21G-17. 
56. 307 F.:3d 24:3 (:ld Cir. 2002). 
57. Id. at 246-4il. 
58. Id. at 24 7. 
59. /d. at 248-49. 
60. Id. at 249; see also West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260. 206 F.3d 1358 
(lOth Cir. 2000); infra text accompanying note 74. 
61. Sypniewski, 307 F.:ocl at 252. 
62. See id. at 2GO-G2. 
63. Id. at 259-GO. 
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the well-founded fear of racial conflict in the school district.64 
The Third Circuit declared: 
Speech that disrupts education, causes disorder, or 
inappropriately interferes with other students' rights may be 
proscribed or regulated. Everyday school discipline does not 
depend on the necessity of a speech code. In the public school 
setting, the First Amendment protects the nondisruptive 
expression of ideas. It does not erect a shield that handicaps 
the proper functioning of the public schools.65 
Even though the policies in Sypniewski and Saxe shared 
some language, the Sypniewski court found the Warren Hills 
policy to be sufficiently narrower than the SCASD policy and to 
address different circumstances.66 However, one aspect of the 
Warren Hills policy was struck down. The Third Circuit ruled 
that speech creating "ill will" could be broadly interpreted as 
going beyond a link to a disruption required under Tinker, so 
school authorities were ordered to eliminate this phrase from 
the policy.67 Unlike the Saxe appellate panel that did not offer 
school authorities the option of severing the overly broad 
provisions from the SCASD policy, the Third Circuit panel in 
Sypniewski was satisfied that the Warren Hills policy could be 
implemented with the one phrase eliminated.6S 
While upholding the anti-harassment policy in Sypniewski, 
the Third Circuit ruled that T-shirts with Jeff Foxworthy's 
redneck sayings on them did not violate the policy.69 The school 
contended that the shirts abridged the racial harassment policy 
and the school's dress code, but there was no allegation that 
the shirts were indecent or lewd.70 Thus, the Third Circuit 
applied the disruption standard articulated in Tinker and 
found that banning the shirts in question violated the students' 
rights in the absence of a disruption. 71 Although a gang-like 
group, "the Hicks," was associated with racist behavior, the 
fi4. Id. at :!fi:2 
65. Id. at 2ii~ (citation omitted). 
fi6. Id. at. 2fil-G2. 
fi7. ld. at 262· fi6. 
GH. ld. at 2fi:l. 265-66. 
G~. Id. at 2fi~. 
70. Id. at 2ii4. The pertinent part of the dress code prohibits "[c]lothing displaying 
or imprinted wtt.h nudity, vulgarity. obscenity, profanity, double entendre pictures or 
slogans (including those rPlatPd to alcohol, drugs and tobacco), or portraying racial, 
ethnic. or religious stereotyping." Id. at 200 n.6. 
71. ld. at 2:)4. 
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court concluded that the connection between the Hicks and 
redneck sayings was ambiguous at best.72 Therefore, even 
though the anti-harassment policy was upheld, school 
authorities' judgment in enforcing the policy in this particular 
instance was overruled. 73 
III. CHALLENGES TO DISPLAYS OF THE CONFEDERATE FLAG 
HIGHLIGHT THE RANGE OF LOWEI\ COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
A number of cases in addition to Sypniewski have focused 
at least in part on displays of the Confederate flag by public 
school students. Indeed, much of the litigation pertaining to 
anti-harassment policies in the past decade has addressed such 
displays. The Supreme Court has not accepted an appeal in any 
of these cases, and lower courts have differed widely in their 
application of Supreme Court precedent, rendering a range of 
opinions. These different interpretations present challenges 
when school districts try to implement acceptable policies. 
In a 2000 decision, West v. Derby Unified School District 
No. 260, the Tenth Circuit held that a Kansas school district's 
anti-harassment policy met the Tinker standard and upheld 
disciplinary action against a middle school student for drawing 
a Confederate flag during math class in violation of the 
policy. 74 The school district's policy prohibited racial 
harassment or intimidation "by name calling, using racial or 
derogatory slurs, wearing or possession of items depicting or 
implying racial hatred or prejudice," including items that 
denote the Ku Klux Klan, White Supremacy, Black Power, 
Confederate flags, or articles of any hate groups, such as the 
Neo-Nazis. 75 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the school 
district had reason to believe the display of the Confederate 
flag could lead to racial incidents that might cause a school 
disruption and interfere with the rights of others.76 
The same year that West was rendered, the Eleventh 
Circuit in Denno v. School Board of Volusia County, Florida 
rejected a student's claim that disciplinary action for displaying 
72. ld. at 255~56. 
7:3. ld. at 269. 
71. 206 F.3d 1:3513 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
75. ld. at 1361. 
7ti. !d. at 1366. 
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the Confederate flag warranted liability against school officials 
and the school board. 77 The Florida student displayed a small 
Confederate flag to his friends as they were discussing Civil 
War history during an outdoor lunch break. The assistant 
principal saw the flag and instructed Denno to put it away. 
When Denno attempted to explain the historical significance of 
the flag. the assistant principal ordered him to go to the 
administrative office and on the way informed Denno that he 
would be suspended from school. 78 Relying primarily on Fraser 
rather than Tinker, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a 
"flexible reasonableness or balancing standard" should be used 
to assess restrictions on student expression in such cases. 79 
The court granted qualified immunity to the school officials, 
concluding that they did not violate clearly established law; 
they reasonably could believe that the display could be 
prohibited because Confederate flags are highly offensive to 
some individuals and implicate "legitimate school functions 
relating to civility."HO 
In a more recent decision, Scott u. School Board of Alachua 
County, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of the school's ban 
of the Confederate flag where there were racial tensions in the 
school.Sl The Eleventh Circuit upheld the suspension of two 
students who displayed Confederate flags on school premises in 
defiance of the principal's instructions.82 Among other things, 
the students alleged that the threat of a racial disturbance was 
insufficient to justify the principal's unwritten ban.83 The court 
found the Confederate flag disruptive under Tinker but also 
concluded that, even in the absence of a likely disruption, 
school officials under Fraser have a duty to inculcate civil, 
respectful behavior and expression.84 The court acknowledged 
the debate over whether the Confederate flag should be 
considered offensive only if intended to be so or whether the 
flag is "innately offensive" because "it is perceived as offensive 
77. 218 F.:3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000). 
78. ld. at 1270-71. 
79. ld. at 127:l 74. 
80. ld. at 1274 7fi. 
81. :324 F.:3d 1246 (11th Cir. 200:3). 
82. ld. at 1247. 
83. See id. 
84. !d. at 124H. 
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by so many people."H5 Nonetheless, the appeals court concluded 
that school authorities are expected to ban the display of 
symbols of racial prejudice and to teach students with different 
backgrounds to interact in civil terms.86 
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit in D.B. ex rel. Brogdon v. Lafon 
also broadly interpreted the authority of school personnel when 
it upheld a school district's ban on students displaying the 
Confederate flag.87 The court found the potential for such 
displays to be disruptive, and it rejected the students' 
contention that the ban represented viewpoint 
discrimination.ss The school district's dress code prohibits, 
among other things, clothing exhibiting references to illegal 
substances, negative slogans, or vulgarities or that would cause 
a disruption.S9 Although the court found "ample reason" for 
school authorities to anticipate a disruption from students 
wearing the banned symbol,90 the court stated that evidence of 
such a disruption would not be necessary to uphold the 
prohibition.91 The court declared that Tinker does not require 
substantiation of "a preexisting incident of the banned symbol 
evoking disruption."92 Noteworthy is the fact that the dress 
code policy barred "negative slogans," a term that can be 
interpreted in multiple ways, but this phrase was not 
challenged in the case.93 
In contrast, the same appeals court a few years earlier in 
Castorina ex rel Rewt v. Madison County School Board had 
struck down restrictions on displaying the Confederate flag in 
the absence of the threat of a disruption.94 The Sixth Circuit 
reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the 
school district in connection with the district's ban of the 
Confederate flag on clothing and overturned the suspension of 
students for violating the ban by wearing T-shirts with a 
country singer on the front and the Confederate flag on the 
85. !d. 
fl6. !d. at 1249. 
81. 217 Fed. Appx. R1H (6th Cir. 2007). 
88. Id. R.t :024. 
89. Id. R.t :021. 
90. !d. at :02:0. 
91. See id. at :02:0. 
92. Id. 
93. !d. at 521. 
94. 246 F.:id R:if) (6th Cir. 2001). 
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back.95 The principal had instructed the two students to 
change their shirts because they were in violation of the dress 
code that in part prohibits attire that has "racist 
implications."96 When the students refused to comply, their 
parents were called and informed that if the students would go 
home and change their shirts, they would not be disciplined.97 
The parents supported their children's decision not to change 
their shirts, and after two suspensions for wearing the shirts, 
the students withdrew from school and were home-schooled for 
the remainder of the year.98 They brought suit, and the district 
court dismissed the students' claims, but the appeals court 
reversed.99 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the students wore 
the shirts to express a viewpoint (celebrating their southern 
heritage and Hank Williams' birthday).100 The court applied 
Tinker in reaching its decision, noting that the school did not 
produce evidence of racial tension in the school or that the 
plaintiffs' conduct would likely lead to violence or any other 
disruption.l OJ Moreover, the court concluded that the school 
board had enforced the dress code in an uneven and viewpoint-
specific manner. For example, clothing with iron crosses and 
venerating Malcom X had been allowed.l02 Thus, the students 
prevailed in establishing a violation of their free speech 
rights.lO:l 
Other courts also have ruled in favor of students' rights to 
display the Confederate flag, finding that prohibitions impair 
their free expression rights. For example, in Bragg v. Swanson, 
a West Virginia federal district court found a school's policy 
prohibiting the display of the Confederate flag as a symbol of 
racism to be unconstitutionally overbroad under the First 
Amendment.l04 Therefore, a student was successful m 
95. !d. 
96. !d. at s:m. 
97. !d. at 5:39. 
98. !d. 
99. I d. 
100. !d. at ;):19. 
101. !d. at fi44. 
102. !d. at 540-41. 
103. !d. at 544. 
104. 371 F. Supp. 2cl 814 (S.D. W.Va. 2005). The school district's policy manual did 
not mention the Confederate f1ag. However, based on a request from the faculty, 
coupled with the principal's negative experiences with displays of the flag at other 
schools, the principal draftpd a dress code enforcemfmt policy for the school. The 
relevant aspect of this policy stated: "Profanity, vulgarity, sexual innuendo, and racist 
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challenging disciplinary action for wearing the flag on aT-shirt 
and belt buckle. The court reasoned that display of the 
Confederate f1ag per se is not patently offensive,105 noting that 
the student had a strong sense of his southern background and 
wore the emblems to reflect this heritage.106 Moreover, the 
court recognized that the student had worn the clothing for 
three years without incident and that only when the new 
principal expanded the dress code in an enforcement policy did 
it become an issue.107 Reasoning that Tinker's disruption 
standard governed this case, the court noted that the policy 
was overbroad in prohibiting some attire that was not racially 
offensive and found no evidence of the banned attire leading to 
a disruption.lOH According to this court, a prohibition on 
displaying the Confederate flag simply because some people 
associate it with racism was insufficient justification.109 Thus, 
the school district was ordered to expunge from the student's 
record any notation of disciplinary action and was enjoined 
from enforcing the overbroad portion of the policy barring 
offensive language or symbols, defined as including racist 
language or symbols such as the Confederate flag.llO 
The body of litigation involving challenges to student 
displays of the Confederate f1ag reflects different views across 
jurisdictions, and the Supreme Court has declined to clarify the 
governing legal principles. It appears that the courts applying 
Fraser generally rule in favor of the school authorities, whereas 
those applying Tinker tend to uphold the students' rights 
unless there is clear evidence of racial conflict within the 
school. However, as revisited in the concluding section, the 
circumstances that trigger each standard remain somewhat 
unclear. 
language and/or symbols or graphics are prohibited. This includes items displaying the 
Rebel [Confederate! flag, which has been used as a symbol of racism at high schools in 
Putnam County." !d. at H 1 H. 
106. See ld. at H27. 
106. Id. at H20. 
107. Id. at 819-20. 
l 08. !d. at H27. 
109. ld. at H2H-29. 
110. Id. at 829. 
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IV. PROHIBITIONS ON DEMEANING EXPRESSION BASED ON 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION: DOES TINKER'S SECOND PRONG HAVE 
TEETH? 
Controversies that pit free exercise and free speech rights 
against prohibitions on harassing and demeaning expression 
based on sexual orientation have proven particularly volatile. 
As discussed above, the Third Circuit focused attention on this 
topic in Saxe when it struck down a school district's anti-
harassment policy as overbroad, ruling in favor of a student 
who claimed that he could not express his religious beliefs 
about homosexuality because of the school district's policy.111 
More recently, an Ohio student prevailed in challenging 
school administrators' actions prohibiting him from wearing a 
shirt denigrating homosexuality, Islam, and abortion.l12 
Rejecting the school administrators' assertion that the shirt 
was "plainly offensive" in violation of the principle articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Fraser, the federal district court 
reasoned that Fraser governs the manner and not the content 
of expression.l1:3 Applying Tinker's disruption standard, the 
court found no interference with the educational process or 
evidence that the shirt might cause such a disruption in the 
future.ll4 The court also rejected the contention that the 
expression interfered with the rights of others in violation of 
Tinker.ll5 The court found the mere fact that some classmates 
might be offended to be insufficient to justify the school's 
prohibition on wearing the shirt.ll6 The court declared that no 
cases had turned on Tinker's second prong-allowing 
censorship of student expression that collides with the rights of 
others-as the controlling legal principle.ll7 However, that 
111. Saxe v. State Coil. Area Sch. Dist. (SCASD), 240 F.:1d 200. 217 (:1d Cir. 2001): 
srr also Chambers v. Rabbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 106/l (D. Minn. 2001) (granting a 
temporn.ry order allowing a student to wear a sweatshirt. displaying thl' message 
"Straight Pride" in the absence of any disruption). 
112. Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., :3H:1 F. Supp. 2d 96G (S.D. Ohio 
200fi). The student had purchased the shirt at a church camp. The front of thl' shirt 
rt>ad: "INTOLERANT. ,Jesus said ... I am the way, the truth and the life .• John 14:6.'' 
The following sentences wt>re on the hack of the shirt: "Homosexuality is a sin~ Islam is 
a lie' Abortion is murder~ Some issues art> just black and whill• 1" !d. at 9(17. 
11:1. Id. at 971. 
111. Jd. at 97:1. 
llG. Id. at 974. 
116. ld. 
117. ld. 
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assertion no longer is true. 
The Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion in 2006, 
marking its second significant student expression decision 
rendered within one month.118 In Harper u. Poway Unified 
School District, the Ninth Circuit became the first appellate 
court to rely primarily on Tinker's pronouncement that student 
expression intruding on the rights of others can be curtailed.119 
Applying this standard, the court upheld a California school 
district's ban on students wearing T-shirts displaying 
disparaging messages about homosexuality.12o The shirt at 
issue included the following handwritten messages on the front 
or back: "I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS 
CONDEMNED;" "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED 
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED;" and "HOMOSEXUALITY 
IS SHAMEFUL 'Romans 1:27."'121 The school involved had a 
history of conflicts over issues pertaining to sexual orientation, 
and much of the conflict seemed to center on the Gay-Straight 
Alliance's annual "Day of Silence," which was intended to teach 
tolerance regarding sexual orientation. 122 In 2003, some 
students had organized a "Straight Pride Day" a week after the 
"Day of Silence," during which they wore shirts displaying 
derogatory remarks about homosexuals. The shirt that 
generated the lawsuit was worn by Tyler Harper during the 
2004 "Day of Silence" and on the following day.12:3 Even though 
the school district did not have a written anti-harassment 
policy, teachers and administrators felt that the words on the 
student's shirt were inflammatory.l24 Harper was given 
opportunities to remove the shirt, and after he refused, he was 
not allowed to wear the shirt on campus. He was kept in the 
office where he completed his work, but there was no 
disciplinary action taken, and his record had no indication of 
118. See Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
disciplinary action against a student for displaying a banner with the phrase "BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS" violated his clearly established expression rights). rev"d, 127 S. Ct. 
2618 (2007) (upholding the disciplinary action for expression viewed as promoting 
illegal activity); supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
119. 445 F.:3d 1166, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted and judgment vacated 
v.:ith instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). 
120. Id. at 1178. 
121. Id.atll7l. 
122. I d. 
123. I d. 
124. Id. at 1172. 
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the incident.125 Harper brought suit, the district court denied 
his motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit 
agreed.126 
The appeals court relied on the second prong of Tinker, 
finding that the derogatory statements constituted speech that 
"'intrude[d] upon ... the rights of other students' or 'collide[d] 
with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let 
alone."'127 Indeed, the court held that "Harper's wearing of his 
T-shirt 'collide[d] with the rights of other students' in the most 
fundamental way," in that students have a right to be free from 
attacks at school "on the basis of a core identifying 
characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation."128 
The court reasoned that the school was allowed to prohibit 
Harper's conduct, regardless of the adoption of a valid anti-
harassment policy, as long as it could show that the restriction 
was necessary to prevent a violation of the rights of other 
students or a substantial disruption of school activities.129 The 
court declared that speech can impinge on the rights of other 
students under Tinker, even though the "speaker does not 
directly accost individual students with his remarks,"J:HJ and 
supported the school in banning the T-shirt that was "injurious 
to gay and lesbian students and interfered with their right to 
learn."131 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Third Circuit's 
earlier suggestion in Saxe that injurious slurs interfering with 
the rights of others cannot be barred unless they also are 
12i'i. ld. 
126. ld. at 117:), 1192. 
127. ld. at 1177 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.. :;9:l U.S. 
50:l. ;,oH (1969)). The court also rejected Harper's claim that the school's action in 
banning his shirt ahridgt'd his free exercise of religion and violated the Establishment 
Clause. Equal Protection Clause, and other protected rights. !d. at 1186-92. 
12R. ld. at 1178: see also Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 20 I 11d. of 
Educ .. :WCl7 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28172 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007) (denying students' rPquest 
for a preliminary injunction to allow them to wear T-shirts, buttons, or sticket·s hearing 
the phrase, "Be Happy, Not Gay," to express their opposition to homosexuality: school 
authorities have a legitimate pedagogical reason to promote tolerance of diffprences 
and to protect stud<mts from harassment); Governor WPntworth Reg'! Sch. Dist. v. 
Hendrickson. 421 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D.N.H. 2006) (upholding suspension of a ga:-· 
student for wearing an arm patch with a swastika and the intnnational "no" S\mbol 
superimposed over it, given the friction lwtween gay stud<'nts and "redn<>cks" in the 
school and administrators' need to promote safety). 
l 29. Harper, 44f> F.:ld at 1175 n.1 l. 
1 >lO. !d. at ll77-7H. 
1 :n. !d. at llRO. 
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disruptiveYl2 
The Ninth Circuit specifically noted that because the free 
speech claim was assessed based on Tinker, the court did not 
have to consider whether Harper's expression was "plainly 
offensive" and censorable under Fraser.l33 Thus, clarification of 
the reach of Fraser was sidestepped by the Ninth Circuit in 
Harper and subsequently by the Supreme Court in Morse as 
well. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Morse noted that "the mode 
of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear,"l:H but 
whatever approach was used, the Fraser Court "certainly did 
not conduct the 'substantial disruption' analysis prescribed by 
Tinher."1:35 
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harper 
but vacated the appellate court ruling with instructions for the 
appeal to be dismissed as moot.136 The Court relied on 
precedent indicating that because the district court in Harper 
had entered a final judgment dismissing the claims, the 
Supreme Court could not render a decision on the merits of the 
case.J:l7 Once again, the Court has left the volatile First 
Amendment issues raised by anti-harassment restrictions to be 
clarified another day. 
V. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF ANTI-HARASSMENT PROVlSlO:\TS 
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling pertaining to a 
school district's anti-harassment policy or to the application of 
unwritten restrictions in this regard, school authorities are left 
to navigate a maze of conflicting lower court rulings in their 
efforts to provide legal guidance to school boards in enacting 
policies and to educators in implementing the provisions. Only 
two generalizations can be offered with any confidence. First, 
regardless of the type of restriction-anti-harassment policy, 
1:12. !d. at 1179 n.21 (~iting Saxe v. State Col!. Area Sch. Dist. (SCASD), 240 F.:3d 
200, 217 (:ld Cir. 20(ll)). 
I :;:3. !d. at 1176 n.14. 
J:l-!. l\1orse v. Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2GHl, 2G2G (2007). 
1:J,'J. !d. at 2G27 (~iting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. S~h. Dist., 393 U.S. 50:1. 
514 (1 %9)). 
1 :Hi. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 14H4 (2007), on remand, 485 
F.:ld 1 OG2 (9th Cir. 2007), appeal dismissed as moot pursuant tu instructions from the 
Supreme Court. 
1:l7. !d. 
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dress code, or simply a school practice-constraints on student 
expression that are discriminatorily applied will not survive 
judicial scrutiny. If school authorities allow some clothing in a 
banned category to be worn, but censor other items in the 
category, or if they treat students differently for the same 
expression, the aggrieved students will likely prevail.l38 
Second, judicial guidance is fairly clear in situations where 
there have been racial incidents or evidence of racial tension in 
the school. Under these circumstances, courts have endorsed 
anti-harassment policiesl39 and have upheld school authorities 
in disciplining students for displays of Confederate flags or 
other emblems associated with racial conflicts.l40 
The guidance is much less clear where the relationship to 
racial tension and school disruption is not apparent. Despite 
the Sixth Circuit's recent statement that evidence of a 
disruption is not required to prohibit Confederate flag 
displays,l41 in cases to date where courts have upheld 
prohibitions on racial harassment and racially charged 
symbols, a connection to racial incidents usually has been 
established.l42 Only the courts broadly interpreting the 
discretion afforded to school authorities to curtail student 
expressiOn under Fraser seem willing to accept school 
authorities' restrictions on harassing expression without 
evidence that such displays are likely to trigger a disruption.l43 
Ambiguity surrounds whether a school district's adoption of 
a written anti-harassment policy affects the case outcomes. 
Some prohibitions on certain expression in public schools have 
been upheld in light of a written policy, 144 whereas other 
138. See, e.g, Castorina ex rei. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 
541, 542, 544 (6th Cir. 2001); supra text accompanying not<e 94. 
139. See, e.g., Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'] Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 265, 
268 (3d Cir. 2002); supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
140. See, e.g, Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, :124 F.:od 124(), 1249 (11th Cir. 
2003); supra text accompanying note 81. 
141. D.B. ex rei. Brogdon v. Lafon, 217 Fed. Appx. fi 18, fi2fi (6th Cir. 2007); supra 
text accompanying notes 91. 
142. See, e.g, Scott, :324 F.:3d 1246, 1249: Sypniewshi. :HJ7 F.:3d at 247-49; West v. 
Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F. 3d 1358. 1362 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
143. See, e.g, Denno v. Sch. Bd. ofVolusia County, Fla .. 218 F.:3d 1267. 1273-74 
(11th Cir. 2000) (applying the "flexible reasonableness'' standard drawn from Fraser); 
supra text accompanying note 79. 
144. See, e.r;., West, 20() F.::ld 1358, 1367-()8 (rejecting the plaintiffs facial 
challenge to the school district's harassment policy by holding that the policy was not 
vague or overbroad); supra text accompanying note 74. 
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prohibitions have been upheld without reference to such a 
policy.l45 In some instances students have prevailed in 
expressing their views because challenged policies have been 
considered vague or overbroad, 146 whereas other students have 
successfully challenged censorship action that is not pursuant 
to a written anti-harassment policy.147 Since cases are not 
turning on the presence or absence of a written policy-and 
such policies can increase legal challenges to the wording 
selected-some school districts might try to avoid overbreadth 
claims by operating without anti-harassment policies. In short, 
school authorities may question the wisdom of enacting an 
anti-harassment policy that might increase their legal 
vulnerability when they may be able to prohibit the targeted 
expression without one. However, other school authorities may 
prefer to enact such policies, which embody values the district 
is attempting to promote, to provide a useful guide for 
students, parents, and others involved m the school 
community.14H 
It is also unclear whether anti-harassment aspects of dress 
codes evoke less judicial scrutiny than do constraints on 
expression in more general anti-harassment policies; some 
restrictions on harassing attire in dress codes have been upheld 
whereas others have been invalidated.149 Nonetheless, school 
authorities may decide that they can avoid controversies over 
harassing clothing by adopting very prescriptive dress codes or 
perhaps student uniforms, which are becoming increasingly 
14i). Sec, e.g, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.:ld 1166. 1175 n.ll (9th 
Cir. 2006) (deciding not to make "even a preliminary judgment as to the 
constitutionality" of the school's anti-harassment policy); supra text accompanying note 
119. 
l4G. See, e.g. Saxe v. State Coli. Area Sch. Dist. (SCASD), 240 F.3d 200, 214-15 
(3d Cir. 2001): supra text accompanying note :39. 
14 7. Sec, e.g .. Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., :3H:l F. Supp. 2d 9fi:) (S.D. 
Ohio 200:1): supra text accompanying note 112. 
141-l. It should he noted that half the states have enacted anti-bullying laws that 
prohibit certain student behavior in public schools, usually overt, repeated acts or 
gestun•s intended to harass, intimidate, ridicule, humiliate, or harm another studpnt. 
Sec National Conference of State Legislatures, School Bullyinl{ Overview. Mar. 2007. 
ami/able at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/bullyingoverview.htm. Also. 
professional education associations are focusing considerable attention on technology-
use policies to curtail cyberhullying. See Erin Uy, Cyherbullying Boom Elicits New 
School Internet Guidelines, EDUC. DAlLY, Jan. 25, 2008, at 2. 
149. Compare D. B. ex rei. Brogdon v. Lafon, 217 Fed. Appx. 518 (6th Cir. 2007), 
with Bragg v. Swanson, :171 F. Supp. 2d H14 (S.D. W. Va. 2005): supra text 
accompan:-;ing notes 87 and I 04. 
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popular in urban districts.l50 As long as the policies are not 
adopted to suppress student expression, courts have upheld 
restrictive dress codes and student uniform requirements 
designed to advance legitimate educational goals, such as 
increasing the focus on learning, reducing the presence of gang 
symbols, and neutralizing socioeconomic distinctions.Ji'il It 
remains to be seen whether recent mixed results in litigation 
challenging anti-harassment policies will encourage school 
districts to mask some anti-harassment provisions in very 
restrictive dress codes (e.g., barring clothing with any writing 
or symbols). 
Particularly ambiguous are the legal principles governing 
religious challenges to anti-harassment policies that bar 
demeaning expression based on sexual orientation. These 
controversies are especially troublesome because of the 
important competing interests at stake-the protection of 
religious expression and the protection of vulnerable minority 
groups from harassment. Indeed, some unusual coalitions have 
formed (e.g., conservative citizen groups and civil libertarians) 
to assert students' rights to voice their religious objections to 
homosexuality and to challenge school districts' anti-
harassment policies that prevent such expression.l52 
Countering these assertions, public schools contend that they 
have not only the authority, but also the duty, to promote civil 
behavior and expression and to protect vulnerable students 
from classmates' hurtful expression.l5.3 
150. Debra Nussbaum, Any Color You Lihe, as Lonf.[ as It's Black. N.Y. TJ\IJ-:,.;. Feb. 
19. 2006, at 6. 
151. See, e.g., Blau v. Ft. Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.::ld ::l81, :398-400 (fith Cir. 
200fi) (prohibiting, among other things, baggy or revealing clothing; tops and bottoms 
that do not overlap; visible body piercing other than ears; clothing that is distn·ssed or 
has holes; flip-flop sandals or high platform shoes; pants. shorts. or skirts that are not 
solid navy. black. khaki. or white; tops with writing on them and logos largn than the 
size of a quarter. except for the school's logo; and tops that are not a solid color): 
Littlefield v. Forney lndep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 2HO (5th Cir. 2001) (n·quiring 
students to wear specific types of shirts or blouses of particular colors with blue or 
khaki pants, shorts, skirts, or jumpers; specifying that clothing be made of specific 
materials; requiring certain types of shoes; and prohibiting any clothing suggesting 
gang affiliation). School districts mandating student uniforms may he n•quirecl to 
include mechanisms for requesting waivers, and make provisions for students who 
cannot afford to purchase the uniforms. For cases involving school uniforms. see 
Wilkins v. Penns Grove-Carneys Point Reg'! Sch. Dist., 12:3 Fed. Appx. 4~J:l (:ld Cir. 
200fi); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 4:37 (fith Cir. 2001). 
lfi2. See Andrew Trotter, Justice:; Differ Sharply on Student Speech. EIHJ<'. WEEK, 
Mar. 2R, 2007, at 20-2.3. 
1fi:l. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bel. of Alachua County. :J24 F.:ld 1246. 124!-l (11th Cir. 
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Assuming that the Supreme Court does eventually accept a 
Harper-type case, the outcome of the Court's deliberations is 
very difficult to predict. Justices Alito and Kennedy might side 
with the students asserting a right to air religious views about 
homosexuality, given their concurrence in the recent Morse 
decision.154 They emphasized that they were joining the Morse 
majority in upholding the school board's disciplinary action 
against the student only if the Court's opinion was limited to 
curtailing expression that promotes illegal drugs.l Pi5 According 
to these justices, student comments about "any political or 
social issue" cannot be censored by school authorities unless 
disruptive.156 Given that Justice Alito authored the Saxe 
decision striking down an anti-harassment policy challenged as 
inhibiting religious speech, 157 he seems especially likely to side 
with those asserting a First Amendment right to air their 
religious views, despite such expression offending some 
classmates. However, Justice Kennedy's position is more 
difficult to predict from the opinions he has authored.158 
Justice Thomas would probably side with the school district in 
creating and implementing anti-harassment policies. Even 
though he supports greater accommodation of religion in public 
schools,159 it would be difficult for him to endorse an expansion 
of students' expression rights, given his very strong statement 
in his Morse concurrence that public school students have no 
First Amendment expression rights at all.160 
The positions of the other Supreme Court justices are much 
2003); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Vol usia County, Fla., 218 F.:3d 12(i7. 1:21:1 (11th Cir. 2000); 
West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 23 F. Supp. 2d 122:\. 12:l:l (D. Kan. 1998); see 
also supra note 148. 
154. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (A\ ito, .J., joined by Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
155. Id. 
156. See id. 
157. Saxe v. State Coli. Area Sch. Dist. (SCASlJ), 240 F.:ld 200 (:3d Cir. 2001); 
supra text accompanying notes :39-55. 
158. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in I~awrence u. Texas, 5:39 U.S. 
558 (2003) (invalidating a state law that demeaned the existence of homosexuals and 
their right to engage in private sexual conduct). Thus, an argument might be made 
that he would side with school authorities in supporting ant i-han1ssment restrictions 
pertaining to sexual orientation in a Harper-type case. 
159. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 5:3:3 U.S. D8 (2001) (holding that 
because the school allowed some community groups to usP its facilities, it had to grant 
access immediately after school for an evangelical religious group to hold devotional 
meetings targeting elementary-age students who attended the school). 
160. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 26:30 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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more ambiguous and will likely depend on how individual 
justices balance their commitments to 1) the protection of 
student expression, including religious expression; 2) deference 
to local school authorities in making decisions regarding what 
constitutes civil behavior and expression; and 3) instilling 
respect for diversity among public school students.H51 It is 
possible that a decision on the merits of a Harper-type case will 
not reflect the conservative and liberal justices voting in blocks 
as has often been evident.162 In fact, some civil libertarians 
may be conflicted over whether to champion students' rights to 
express disparaging sentiments about homosexuality or to side 
with the school m protecting captive students from 
harassment. 
It is too soon to conclude that other courts will adopt the 
Ninth Circuit's reliance on the second prong of Tinker in 
holding that demeaning expression based on sexual orientation 
unconstitutionally interferes with the rights of others. Yet, 
there is considerable support for such an outcome, given that 
public schools have an important role in cultivating the "habits 
and manners of civility"16:3 essential in a democracy and that 
"schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized 
social order."164 Also, there is widespread interest in 
preventing student bullying because of its connection to school 
violence.165 Many educators as well as legal commentators 
have assumed that the important obligations of public schools 
in instilling basic values, such as respect for others with 
different backgrounds and beliefs, must override students' 
Hil. Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg have dissc>nted both in cases 
curtailing the protection of student expression and prohibiting school distt·icts from 
using race in student assignment plans. See Morse. 127 S. Ct. at :w:JS-4:3 ( Brc·~·er. .J.. 
concurring in part, dissenting in part): id. at 2n4 7 (Stevens. ,J., joined b:.· Souter. 
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (supporting students' rights to express non-disruptive views 
in school and at school-sponsored events): Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1. 127 S. Ct. 27:38, 2800 (2007) (Breyer .• J., joined bv Steve>ns, Souter. 
Ginsburg. JJ .. dissenting) (voicing support for advancing diversity in public oc:hoo\s). 
162. See, e.g, majority and dissenting opinions in Parents lnuolued in Cmty. Sch .. 
127 S. Ct. 27:lH: Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2G I H: sec also Linda Greenhouse, The Kennedy 
Factor on the Hoherts Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. :n, 200(), ~ 4, at 2: .Jeffrey Toohin. The 
Tall! of the Town: Fiue to Four. NEWYOI\KEH, June 2fi. 2007, at :l;,, 
w:1. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:1 v. Frasc·r, 47H U.S. fi7fi, G81 (I !-JHfi). 
Hi4. Id. at GH:o. 
I Gfi. See ROilEWJ' FEI:--J, BilYAN VOSSEKUIL, WILLIAM POLLA!'K, RANDY BOIWM. 
WIUJA!\1 MODZELESKI & MAl\ ISA REDDY. THREAT ASSESSI\IE:--JT I;\; SCHOOLS: A (;l!IDE TO 
l\!L\:--J.\(;]:-.JG THRK·\TE:--JI:-.JG SITUATIO:-.JS A:--JD TO CI\EATI:--JG SM'E SCHOOL CLI~L'.TES 
(2002); see also supra note 14il. 
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interests in expressing some views in public schools.166 
Consistently, and most recently in Morse, the Supreme 
Court has considered the public school a special environment 
where the rights of students are not coextensive with those of 
adults elsewhere.167 It might follow that a majority of the 
Supreme Court justices will uphold an anti-harassment 
provision that protects groups of students from ridicule by 
classmates. Yet, there are compelling First Amendment rights 
that also must be considered.l68 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Currently, educators understandably are insecure m 
balancing public schools' obligations and students' rights in 
terms of appropriate and protected expression in public schools. 
The Supreme Court's prior rulings have not yielded clear legal 
principles to guide the lower courts in this regard. Without 
such guidance, the lower courts have not developed much 
consistency to inform school administrators as to how far they 
may go in setting anti-harassment standards. And the 
Supreme Court declined the opportunity to clarify the law in 
this arena in Harper. Thus, how to balance these important 
concerns in protecting students from hurtful and demeaning 
expression against the competing interests in encouraging 
students to freely express their views remains a vexing 
challenge, and one that the Supreme Court is not likely to 
resolve soon. 
166. See BEARD, BEAim & BEAH!l, supra note 35: McCarth~·. supm notl' :15. 
167. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682; Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist.. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
168. See Thomas E. Wheeler II, How Far Is Too Furl Limiting (~yber-Speech by 
Students, SCH. BOARD NEWS, Apr. 2008. 
